Time, Justice, and Human Rights: Statutory Limitation on the Right to Truth? by Schabas, W.A.
[Type	here]	
	





Although not explicitly set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
other foundational human rights documents, there is an growing recognition of a 
fundamental ‘right to truth’. This is often expressed as a component of the 
requirement that justice be delivered for serious violations of human rights, including 
the core principles of the right to life and the prohibition of torture. Transitional 
justice requires various measures of accountability of which criminal prosecution of 
perpetrators is only one element. However, recent decision of international courts and 
tribunals, including the European Court of Human Rights and the International Court 
of Justice, manifest a reluctance to extend the right to truth too far into the past. It is 
as if they have imposed a form of time bar or statutory limitation on the right to know 
the truth, even when the inquiry concerns the very atrocities, namely genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, whose prosecution cannot be restricted.  
That legal rights and entitlements are subject to temporal limitation is not a 
controversial proposition. In many legal systems, even a murder cannot be prosecuted 
after a certain lapse of time. During the 1960s, just two decades after the Nuremberg 
trial, many convicted and released war criminals were being re-integrated into society 
and returning to their professional networks, while others who bore responsibility for 
wartime atrocities were still at large. Statutory limitation or prescription of 
prosecution in some countries threatened to block accountability. In order to address 
this, the United Nations undertook work on an international convention to deal with 
the issue.  
In November 1968, the General Assembly adopted the Convention on Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity.1 
The treaty entered into force two years later after obtaining its tenth ratification.2 To 
date, fewer than fifty-five States have ratified the treaty. In 1974, the Council of 
Europe adopted its own regional treaty on the same subject. Although open to all 
forty-seven members of the Council of Europe, only three have ratified the European 
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes against 
Humanity and War Crimes.3 The lack of enthusiasm for the treaties on the subject 




be the case. Article 29 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
adopted in 1998, declares that genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the 
crime of aggression are ‘not be subject to any statute of limitations’. There are 124 
States Parties to the Rome Statute and several other States have signed it. 
International judges have spoken of ‘a broad and recent consensus, the criminal 
punishability of crimes against humanity without any time-limit can be considered as 
a principle of customary international law, binding on all States’.4 
 The 1968 Convention may be viewed as the first foray of the United Nations 
into accountability for historic atrocities. At its first session, in 1946, the General 
Assembly had adopted a resolution affirming the ‘principles of international law 
recognized by the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal and the judgment of the 
International Military Tribunal’.5 The same day, another resolution was adopted 
recognizing genocide as an international crime, confirming in its preamble that 
‘[m]any instances of such crimes of genocide have occurred’.6 However, the United 
Nations was not then involved in the investigation of human rights violations. Its 
members would have shuddered at the idea that the organization would concern itself 
not only with the present and the future but also with the past. 
 By the 1990s, the United Nations human rights organs began to speak about  a 
‘right to truth’. This had already emerged at the regional level. In 1986, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights observed that ‘every society has the 
inalienable right to know the truth about past events, as well as the motives and 
circumstances in which aberrant crimes came to be committed, in order to prevent 
repetition of such acts in the future’.7 In his 1997 report to the United Nations to the 
Sub-Commission on the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, Louis Joinet, a 
long-time expert within the United Nations human rights system, wrote: 
This is not simply the right of any individual victim or his nearest and dearest 
to know what happened, a right to the truth. The right to know is also a 
collective right, drawing upon history to prevent violations from recurring in 
the future. Its corollary is a ‘duty to remember’ on the part of the State: to be 
forearmed against the perversions of history that go under the names of 
revisionism or negationism, for the history of its oppression is part of a 
people's national heritage and as such must be preserved. These, then, are the 
main objectives of the right to know as a collective right.8 
 
Joinet listed the ‘right to truth’ as Principle 1 in the Set of Principles for the Protection 




presented as a right of a ‘people’ rather than of individuals: 
Every people has the inalienable right to know the truth about past events and 
about the circumstances and reasons which led, through the consistent pattern 
of gross violations of human rights, to the perpetration of aberrant crimes. Full 
and effective exercise of the right to the truth is essential to avoid any 
recurrence of such acts in the future.9 
 
In the French version, he wrote: ‘Chaque peuple a le droit inaliénable…’.  Principle 2, 
entitled ‘The Duty to Remember’, stated: 
 
A people’s knowledge of the history of their oppression is part of 
their heritage and, as such, shall be preserved by appropriate measures in 
fulfilment of the State’s duty to remember. Such measures shall be aimed 
at preserving the collective memory from extinction and, in particular, at 
guarding against the development of revisionist and negationist arguments.10 
 
Principle 5 required that States ‘ensure the preservation of, and access to, archives 
concerning violations of human rights and humanitarian law’.11 
A decade later, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights requested 
independent expert Diane Orentlicher to prepare an updated version of the Principles. 
Professor Orentlicher made some minor changes to the text of Joinet’s first principle: 
Every people has the inalienable right to know the truth about past events 
concerning the perpetration of heinous crimes and about the circumstances 
and reasons that led, through massive or systematic violations, to the 
perpetration of those crimes. Full and effective exercise of the right to the 
truth provides a vital safeguard against the recurrence of violations.12 
 
She also reformulated the text about ‘[a] people’s knowledge of the history of its 
oppression’ and the importance of archives, saying this was ‘part of its heritage and, 
as such, must be ensured by appropriate measures in fulfilment of the State’s duty to 
preserve archives and other evidence concerning violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law and to facilitate knowledge of those violations’.13 
Inevitably, the past – indeed, the rather distant past – surfaced as an issue at 
the Durban Conference on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance in September 2001. The Declaration adopted by the Conference 
emphasized ‘remembering the crimes or wrongs of the past’ and ‘telling the truth 
about history’ were ‘essential elements for international reconciliation and the 
creation of societies based on justice, equality and solidarity’.14 The Declaration 




to the recent past’, all of this ‘with a view to achieving a comprehensive and objective 
cognizance of the tragedies of the past’.15 It referred specifically to slavery, the slave 
trade, the transatlantic slave trade, apartheid, colonialism and genocide, and indicated 
the relationship between these historic abuses and those of the present day.16 It also 
referred to ‘dark chapters in history’.17 The equivocal conclusion spoke of a ‘moral 
obligation on the part of all concerned States’, saying they should take measures ‘to 
halt and reverse the lasting consequences of those practices’.18 Another deliberate 
ambiguity in the Declaration concerned the application of international criminal law 
to the past: ‘[S]lavery and the slave trade are a crime against humanity and should 
always have been so, especially the transatlantic slave trade’.19 
 The first United Nations Human Rights Council resolution on the right to truth 
declared that ‘the public and individuals are entitled to have access, to the fullest 
extent practicable, to information regarding the actions and decision-making 
processes of their Government, within the framework of each State’s domestic legal 
system’. 20  Furthermore, ‘States should preserve archives and other evidence 
concerning gross violations of human rights and serious violations of international 
humanitarian law’.21 The Resolution requested the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights to prepare a comprehensive study of the question, ‘including, in 
particular, practices relating to archives and records concerning gross violations of 
human rights with a view to create guidelines on protecting archives and records 
concerning gross human rights violations’.22 
Following the presentation of the Report of the Office of the High 
Commissioner, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution that highlighted ‘the 
importance of preserving historic memory related to gross human rights violations 
and serious violations of international humanitarian law through the conservation of 
archives and other documents related to those violations’.23 Subsequently, the Human 
Rights Council noted a report on the subject by the Office of the High Commissioner 
that pointed to the importance of ensuring ‘that all archives pertaining to human rights 
are preserved and protected, and to enact legislation that declares that the nation’s 
documentary heritage is to be retained and preserved, and creates the framework for 
managing State records from their creation to destruction or preservation’.24 The 
General Assembly has justified the protection of archives as a measure necessary to 
‘facilitate knowledge’ of gross violations of human rights and serious violations of 





The ‘Procedural Right to Truth’ at the European Court of Human Rights 
 
Louis Joinet’s early discussion of the right to truth did not point to specific provisions 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the treaties. Nevertheless, his 
remarks were situated in a discussion of impunity where two fundamental rights -- the 
right to life and the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment -- are of 
particular importance. In this context, the European Court of Human Rights has 
developed the notion of a ‘procedural dimension’ to these rights.26 Accordingly, there 
is an obligation upon the State to investigate violations of these fundamental rights 
even if it is not itself responsible for them as a perpetrator. The procedural obligation 
of the right to life, set out in article 2 of the European Court of Human Rights, has 
been held to be ‘separate and autonomous’ from the substantive obligation.27 
According to the European Court of Human Rights, the procedural obligation 
entitles victims, their families and heirs to know the truth about circumstances 
associated with a violation of the right to life, especially when this is linked to a large 
scale or massive violation of fundamental rights. For example, it has stressed the 
importance of this ‘in the event of widespread use of lethal force against the civilian 
population during anti-Government demonstrations preceding the transition from a 
totalitarian regime to a more democratic system’.28 Although the issue arises in the 
context of individual rights, there is some authority in the Court’s jurisprudence for 
the recognition of a broader collective or social dimension to this right to know the 
truth. Several cases will illustrate this.   
In one decision regarding Romania, the Court framed the importance of an 
investigation into events in light not only of the rights of the individual applicants but 
‘in view also of the importance to Romanian society of knowing the truth about the 
events of December 1989’.29 In another instance,  El Masri v. the ‘former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia’, where government complicity in ‘extraordinary renditions’ 
by the Central Intelligence Agency was involved, the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights underscored ‘the great importance of the present case not only 
for the applicant and his family, but also for other victims of similar crimes and the 
general public, who had the right to know what had happened’.30 In a concurring 
opinion in that case, several judges noted that the right to truth was implicit in the 




(right to life) and 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment), although they argued that it was best approached from the perspective of 
article 13 (right to a remedy). They wrote: 
 
In practice, the search for the truth is the objective purpose of the obligation to 
carry out an investigation and the raison d’être of the related quality 
requirements (transparency, diligence, independence, access, disclosure of 
results and scrutiny). For society in general, the desire to ascertain the truth 
plays a part in strengthening confidence in public institutions and hence the 
rule of law. For those concerned – the victims’ families and close friends – 
establishing the true facts and securing an acknowledgment of serious 
breaches of human rights and humanitarian law constitute forms of redress 
that are just as important as compensation, and sometimes even more so. 
Ultimately, the wall of silence and the cloak of secrecy prevent these people 
from making any sense of what they have experienced and are the greatest 
obstacles to their recovery.31 
 
In Abu Zubaydah v. Poland, which concerned complicity of Polish authorities in the 
torture of a prisoner who was being transferred to Guantanamo by the United States 
Central Intelligence Agency, a Chamber of the Court wrote: 
 
[W]here allegations of serious human rights violations are involved in the 
investigation, the right to the truth regarding the relevant circumstances of the 
case does not belong solely to the victim of the crime and his or her family but 
also to other victims of similar violations and the general public, who have the 
right to know what has happened.32 
 
Yet another decision of the European Court, referring to the killings by soldiers 
during the conflict in Northern Ireland, insisted upon the importance of a ‘reasoned 
decision available to reassure a concerned public that the rule of law had been 
respected’.33  
In another of the rendition cases, Al Nashiri, the Court cited at length from the 
testimony of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms while counteracting terrorism about the 
importance of the right to truth, although it did not use the expression in its actual 
holding. The Rapporteur told the Court that ‘within the United Nations it was seen as 
a right which had two dimensions – a private dimension and a public dimension. It 
was the consistent position of the UN mechanisms that where gross or systematic 




not one that belonged solely to the immediate victim but also to society.’34  
Then there was the case surrounding the thousands of Polish officers murdered 
at Katyn, which will be discussed at length below.  Granting an application based 
upon article 3 of the European Convention, a Chamber of the European Court said it 
appreciated the fact that their descendants had ‘suffered a double trauma: not only had 
their relatives perished in the war but they were not allowed, for political reasons, to 
learn the truth about what had happened and forced to accept the distortion of 
historical fact by the Soviet and Polish Communist authorities for more than fifty 
years’.35  In its arguments the  Grand Chamber also cited submissions, this time from 
the Open Society Justice Initiative, about the right to truth.36  
 
Katyń at the European Court 
 
If there is such a broad, collective, historical dimension to the right to truth, when 
does it actually begin? Or rather, to return to the discussion on statutory limitation 
with which this chapter began, is it time barred? Do the principles prohibiting 
statutory limitation of crimes against humanity and war crimes provide legal muscle 
to help pry open the door to the more distant past in such a way that ordinary 
procedural and jurisdictional limitations do not apply in the same inflexible manner as 
they may when so-called ordinary crimes are concerned? 
This is an issue that does not arise, at least not in the same way, as long as the 
right to truth is confined to the victims themselves or to their next of kin. From the 
perspective of individual victims, the right presumably exists only as long as they or 
their offspring are themselves alive.37 Perhaps the right can even be transmitted to one 
or more succeeding generations. But when the right is associated with the ‘people’s 
knowledge of the history of its oppression’, and when it is ‘aimed at preserving the 
collective memory from extinction’ because it is ‘a collective right, drawing upon 
history to prevent violations from recurring in the future’, can there be any logical 
basis for a temporal limitation on its scope? This difficult question was complicated 
even further by  a 2013 ruling by a sharply divided Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights that imposed a form of statutory limitation on the right to 
truth.  It barred the door to claims based upon the procedural obligation if the actual 
loss of life occurred prior to the adoption of the European Convention on Human 




The case concerned the refusal of Russia to release documents on the Katyń 
massacre, the mass murder of about 20,000 Polish officers that took place in 1940, 
after eastern Poland had been occupied by the Soviet Union following the German 
invasion of the western part of the country. At the insistence of the Soviet 
prosecutors, the Nazi defendants were accused of responsibility for the killings by the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. After hearing two days of inconclusive 
evidence in the final days of the trial, the judges simply ignored the issue in their final 
ruling.38 The Soviet government persisted in its denial of responsibility for several 
decades. Only in 1990 did Mikhail Gorbachev finally acknowledge the truth. Yet 
years after the admission of guilt, the Russian government continued to refuse to 
release files and documents related to the killings on grounds of national security. 
Relatives of the victims complained of Soviet intransigence before the European 
Court of Human Rights. 
It is well established in case law that from the moment that the European 
Convention enters into force for any given State, there is an obligation upon the State 
Party to ‘secure to everyone’ the rights and freedoms set out in Section I of the 
Convention. Beginning with this ‘critical date’, all of the State’s acts and omissions 
‘not only must conform to the Convention but are also undoubtedly subject to review 
by the Convention institutions’.39 In other words, the obligations of a State Party to 
the European Convention are in principle only prospective in nature. The corollary to 
this is rooted in the presumption that international treaties do not operate retroactively 
unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, 
something confirmed in article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
Consequently, the treaty provisions ‘do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact 
which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry 
into force of the treaty with respect to that party’.40 According to the European Court, 
‘the Convention imposes no specific obligation on the Contracting States to provide 
redress for wrongs or damage caused prior to that date’.41 The Grand Chamber has 
stated that this principle is ‘beyond dispute’.42 
The European Convention entered into force on 3 September 1953 following 
the deposit of the tenth ratification by a Member State of the Council of Europe, as 
provided for by article 59(3) of the Convention. For States that have ratified or 
acceded to the Convention subsequent to that date, the Convention enters into force 




General of the Council of Europe, pursuant to article 59(4). However, exceptionally 
the Court may take into account facts that took place prior to the ‘critical date’ in 
considering the procedural obligation associated with certain fundamental rights, 
notably those in articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. Where a substantive violation of 
the right to life has taken place before the ‘critical date’, the Convention may 
nevertheless apply to the duty of the State Party to conduct an investigation and to 
ensure that measures of accountability exist. In disappearance cases, even if the body 
has been found, ‘[t]his only casts light on one aspect of the fate of the missing person 
and the obligation to account for the disappearance and death, as well as to identify 
and prosecute any perpetrator of unlawful acts in that connection, will generally 
remain’.43  
Following divergences in the case law of the Chambers of the European 
Court,44 in 2009 the Grand Chamber confronted the temporal jurisdiction issue with 
respect to the procedural obligation in a case dealing with medical malpractice. It 
recognised a procedural obligation pursuant to article 2 of the Convention even if the 
actual killing took place prior to the entry into force of the Convention for the 
respondent State. Article 2 establishes that ‘[e]veryone's right to life shall be protected 
by law’ and that ‘[n]o one shall be deprived of his life intentionally’. By fifteen votes 
to two, the Grand Chamber held that ‘the procedural obligation to carry out an 
effective investigation under Article 2 has evolved into a separate and autonomous 
duty’ that constitutes ‘a detachable obligation arising out of Article 2 capable of 
binding the State even when the death took place before the critical date’. 45 
Nevertheless, the Court said that ‘having regard to the principle of legal certainty’ this 
extension of the temporal jurisdiction of the Court was ‘not open-ended’.46 The Grand 
Chamber explained the limitations it was placing on the procedural obligation: 
 
162. First, it is clear that, where the death occurred before the critical date, only procedural 
acts and/or omissions occurring after that date can fall within the Court’s temporal 
jurisdiction. 
163. Second, there must exist a genuine connection between the death and the entry into force 
of the Convention in respect of the respondent State for the procedural obligations imposed by 
Article 2 to come into effect. Thus a significant proportion of the procedural steps required by 
this provision – which include not only an effective investigation into the death of the person 
concerned but also the institution of appropriate proceedings for the purpose of determining 
the cause of the death and holding those responsible to account – will have been or ought to 
have been carried out after the critical date. However, the Court would not exclude that in 
certain circumstances the connection could also be based on the need to ensure that the 





In this way, the Grand Chamber established an exception within an exception. The 
Court could only exercise jurisdiction with respect to a violation of the procedural 
obligation contained in article 2 if a ‘significant proportion of the procedural steps’ 
had been undertaken after the ‘critical date’. However, this requirement could be 
waived if ‘certain circumstances’ required the Court ‘to ensure that the guarantees and 
the underlying values of the Convention are protected in a real and effective manner’. 
This ‘underlying values’ exception has sometimes been called the ‘humanitarian 
clause’.48 These words amounted to an invitation to victims to formulate applications 
relating to investigation of historic violations of the right to life where the truth was 
still obscure, including the Katyn massacre. Within a few years such a case, Janowiec 
and Others v. Russia, filed by relatives of those who had been murdered at Katyn, 
presented itself to the European Court. 
In Janowiec, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights held 
that it could not consider the ‘underlying values’ exception if the loss of life had taken 
place prior to 4 November 1950, the date when the European Convention on Human 
Rights was signed at the Barberini Palace in Rome. It said that ‘a Contracting Party 
cannot be held responsible under the Convention for not investigating even the most 
serious crimes under international law if they predated the Convention’.49 The Grand 
Chamber explained that ‘the events that might have triggered the obligation to 
investigate under Article 2 took place in early 1940, that is, more than ten years 
before the Convention came into existence’. It said that ‘there were no elements 
capable of providing a bridge from the distant past into the recent post-entry into 
force period’.50 At first instance, before the Chamber, the Russian judge had written 
that the European Convention on Human Rights had ‘arisen out of a bloody chapter of 
European history in the twentieth century’ but that it was drafted as part of a process 
of reconstructing post-war Europe and ‘not with the intention of delving into that 
black chapter’.51 
The very substantial dissenting opinion of Judges Ziemele, De Gaetano, 
Laffranque and Keller harshly criticises the majority for turning a ‘long history of 
justice delayed into a permanent case of justice denied’.52  With respect to the 
‘underlying values’ exception in Šilih, the dissenters noted that the majority simply 
did not apply it. The majority’s decision ‘closes the Court’s door to victims of any 
gross human rights violation that occurred prior to the existence of the Convention’, 




that the Court has failed ‘to fulfil the role for which it was intended: to provide a 
Court that would act as a “conscience” for Europe’.54 It is indeed hard to be a 
‘conscience’ if one refuses to even consider the past. Where else does ‘conscience’ 
come from if not the past?  
In Janowiec and Others, it was argued that one factor justifying extension of 
the temporal jurisdiction of the Court, on an exceptional basis, was the importance of 
truth seeking in order to enable nations to learn from their history and take measures 
to prevent future atrocities. 55 Reliance was placed upon the Updated Set of Principles 
drafted by Professor Orentlicher as well as on the International Committee of the Red 
Cross rules of customary international law56 and the case law of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights.57 However, the Grand Chamber distinguished the procedural 
obligation of individual victims comprised in article 2 from ‘other types of inquiries 
that may be carried out for other purposes, such as establishing a historical truth’.58 
The four dissenting judges said that in addition to the rights of the individual victims, 
‘it is equally clear that the obligation to investigate and prosecute those responsible 
for grave human rights and serious humanitarian law violations serves fundamental 
public interests by allowing a nation to learn from its history and by combating 
impunity’.59 
 
The ‘passage of time’ 
 
In recent rulings on the incompatibility of genocide denial legislation with freedom of 
expression, the European Court of Human Rights has referred to ‘the time factor’. A 
seven-judge Chamber said that when debates on historical issues are concerned, ‘the 
passing of time makes it inappropriate to deal with certain remarks about historical 
events, many years on, with the same severity as just a few years before. That forms 
part of the efforts that every country must make to debate its own history openly and 
dispassionately.’60 The Grand Chamber in the same case, after citing an earlier 
precedent where the impugned speech concerned events forty years earlier, said that 
with respect to the Armenian genocide of 1915 ‘the lapse of time between the 
applicant’s statements and the tragic events to which he was referring was 
considerably longer, about ninety years, and at the time when he made the statements 
there were surely very few, if any, survivors of these events’. The Grand Chamber 




issue for many Armenians, especially those in the diaspora’. It said ‘the time element 
cannot be disregarded. Whereas events of relatively recent vintage may be so 
traumatic as to warrant, for a period of time, an enhanced degree of regulation of 
statements relating to them, the need for such regulation is bound to recede with the 
passage of time.’61 The European Court has made similar pronouncements in cases 
dealing with Nazi sympathizers in wartime Switzerland62 supporters of communism 
in modern-day Hungary,63 torturers in Algeria,64 defence of French collaborators 
during the Second World War,65 as well as in cases dealing with individual reputation 
and image.66 
 The European Court’s ‘passage of time’ approach seems rather close to the 
concept of statutory limitation or prescription. In the Armenian genocide case, 
however, the Court seemed to be saying to the descendants of victims of the ‘crime of 
crimes’ that as a century had passed since the atrocities were committed perhaps they 
were insisting too much. Seven members of the Grand Chamber dissented from the 
majority, specifically challenging its views on the passage of time issue. ‘Are we to 
infer that in twenty or thirty years’ time, Holocaust denial itself might be acceptable 
in terms of freedom of expression?’, wrote the dissenters. ‘How can this factor be 
squared with the principle that statutory limitations are not applicable to war crimes 
and crimes against humanity?’1 
 
The Spanish Civil War and the Special Rapporteur on Truth 
 
The Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees 
of non-recurrence, a mandate established by the Human Rights Council in 2011, 
confronted some of these issues, but only indirectly, in his 2014 report on a mission to 
Spain. Pablo de Greiff welcomed efforts at the removal of symbols or monuments 
exalting the military uprising, the Civil War and Franco’s dictatorship.67 Noting the 
importance of the teaching of history, he urged that it be ‘approached as a system of 
investigation rather than a mechanism for simply preserving data [that] can train 
citizens in habits of analysis and critical reasoning’.68 He discussed a number of 
measures under consideration as means of elucidating the truth about Spain’s history, 
including oral history projects, a possible truth commission, and access to archival 
                                               
1  Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27510/08, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Spielmann, 




materials. De Greiff was of course focusing his attention on the Spanish Civil War of 
1936-1939, a conflict that took place prior to Spain’s membership in the United 
Nations, indeed, prior to the existence of the United Nations and, moreover, prior to 
the modern recognition in international law of fundamental human rights including 
the right to life and the prohibition of ill treatment. 
Whether United Nations human rights mechanisms have the authority to 
examine issues relating to the Spanish Civil War is an issue that has also arisen before 
other bodies. In its report to the Committee on Enforced Disappearances, Spain 
explained that following its ratification of the International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, ‘certain organizations —
associations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which may or may not 
have consultative status — have raised the issue of its applicability to enforced 
disappearances alleged to have taken place during the civil war and under the Franco 
regime and the need to abrogate or declare inapplicable the Amnesty Act (No. 
46/1977) of 15 October’. Spain invoked article 35(1) of the Convention that declares 
the Committee to be competent ‘solely in respect of enforced disappearances which 
commenced after the entry into force of this Convention’. 69  The International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance is often 
cited because it is the only international human rights treaty with an explicit 
recognition of the right to truth. The final recital of the Convention’s preamble 
‘[a]ffirm[s] the right of any victim to know the truth about the circumstances of an 
enforced disappearance and the fate of the disappeared person, and the right to 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information to this end’. Article 25(2) states: 
‘Each victim has the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of the 
enforced disappearance, the progress and results of the investigation and the fate of 
the disappeared person. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures in this 
regard.’ 
Recently, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance has 
also considered Spanish cases relating to the civil war. Spain did not object to the 
Working Group’s authority to inquire into these cases.70 Previously, however, it 
seems that the Working Group declined to consider disappearances that occurred prior 
to the creation of the United Nations in 1945.71 In any event, enforced disappearance 
has special features because of its continuous nature,72 something that cannot be said 




The Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth did not speak to whether he 
had ‘jurisdiction’ over the Spanish Civil War and fascist Spain. Like the Working 
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, his mandate says nothing specific 
about its temporal scope. Moreover, if an unresolved disappearance is a continuing 
violation, surely the same can be said about a partial or incomplete truth. The closest 
authority for the Special Rapporteur appears to be operative paragraph 1(b) of the 
relevant resolution: ‘To gather relevant information on national situations, including 
on normative frameworks, national practices and experiences, such as truth and 
reconciliation commissions and other mechanisms, relating to the promotion of truth, 
justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence in addressing gross violations of 
human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law, and to study 
trends, developments and challenges and to make recommendations thereon.’73 If this 
passage is read literally, he is on reasonably solid ground. But if his mandate applies 
to the distant past then can this also be said about the other special procedures? Would 
there not be strenuous opposition within the Human Rights Council and the General 
Assembly if the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions 
were to investigate lynching in the United States prior to the Second World War or if 
the Special Rapporteur on torture were to inquire into the colonial practices of Britain, 
France, Belgium and the Netherlands in the 1930s? Moreover, if the Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion of truth can inquire into the Spanish Civil War and its 
aftermath, can there be any logical reason why he could not also, within the context of 
his mandate, address issues of historical truth surrounding the Armenian genocide of 
1915, the Irish famine of the 1840s, the trans-Atlantic slave trade of the sixteenth, 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the St Bartholomew’s day massacre of 1572, 
and the rape of the Sabine women of 750 BCE? 
 
Temporal limits on the Genocide Convention 
 
There is another recent example of judicial reluctance to look too far into the past, this 
time in a judgment of the International Court of Justice. The debate concerned the 
retroactive application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide. The Convention was adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1948, on 9 December, a date that is henceforth to be commemorated as 




The Convention’s preamble states that ‘at all periods of history genocide has inflicted 
great losses on humanity’, adding that its purpose is ‘to liberate mankind from such an 
odious scourge’. 75  The preamble also makes reference to General Assembly 
Resolution 96(I), adopted two years earlier, that affirmed that ‘[m]any instances of 
such crimes of genocide have occurred when racial, religious, political and other 
groups have been destroyed, entirely or in part’. 
In a 2008 ruling, the International Court of Justice clearly left the door open 
on the question of temporal scope of the Convention, noting ‘that there is no express 
provision in the Genocide Convention limiting its jurisdiction ratione temporis’.76 But 
in February 2015, in its final judgment in the case of Croatia v. Serbia, the Court 
stated definitively that ‘the substantive provisions of the Convention do not impose 
upon a State obligations in relation to acts said to have occurred before that State 
became bound by the Convention’.77 Like the European Court of Human Rights, the 
International Court of Justice pointed to the presumption against retroactivity in 
article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It acknowledged that the 
presumption was rebuttable, providing examples of international criminal law treaties 
with retroactive or retrospective effect, such as the Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. 
On the other hand, the International Court of Justice cited references in the travaux 
préparatoires of the Genocide Convention where a few States suggested it was 
‘intended to apply to acts taking place in the future and not to be applicable to those 




Neither the European Court of Human Rights nor the International Court of Justice 
can be faulted for reaching a conclusion that is not patently unreasonable. Their 
findings are in line with much of the academic commentary as well as with precedent. 
Perhaps the only implausible element is the fixation of the European Court on 4 
November 1950 as the starting date for the right to truth. To the extent it was deemed 
necessary to set a ‘critical date’, it might have been more logical to pick that of the 
entry into force of the European Convention, in line with the approach of the 
International Court of Justice. Or the date of adoption of the Universal Declaration of 




to the final recital of its preamble, was intended ‘to take the first steps for the 
collective enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in the Universal Declaration’. 
But this is a detail. At a time when there is a growing movement within human rights 
law to affirm a right to truth and to insist upon the importance of historical memory, 
these two Courts seem to have drawn a curtain on the past in or around the year 1950.  
 Some will say in defence of these judgments that the courtroom is not the 
place to adjudicate such matters. This message also emerges from a December 2014 
decision of the European Court of Human Rights in an application filed by Yevgeniy 
Yakovlevich Dzhugashvili, a grandson of Joseph Stalin. The applicant had 
unsuccessfully sued a Russian journalist for defamation concerning an article about 
the Katyń massacre that described his grandfather as ‘a bloodthirsty cannibal’.79 
Declaring the application inadmissible, the Chamber said ‘it is an integral part of 
freedom of expression, guaranteed under Article 10 of the Convention, to seek 
historical truth. It is not the Court’s role to arbitrate the underlying historical issues, 
which are part of a continuing debate between historians.’ It added that ‘[a] contrary 
finding would open the way to a judicial intervention in historical debate and 
inevitably shift the respective historical discussions from public forums to 
courtrooms.’80 
It may well be that other institutions, such as truth commissions, are better 
suited to the complex task of detailed examination of the past. But the suspicion 
lingers that far from rising to the challenge of dealing with historical truth, the 
European Court of Human Rights and the International Court of Justice are turning 
their backs on the ‘bloody, black chapters’ to which Judge Kovler referred in his 
dissent in Janowiec. Truth is often linked with reconciliation, as the names of many 
recent commissions bear out. But human experience suggests that sometimes 
reconciliation is better achieved without clarifying the truth or acknowledging it. 
Perhaps this is a leitmotif in the two judgments. 
 That there is a right to truth applicable to recent decades seems today beyond 
dispute. The Janowiec ruling of the Grand Chamber of the European Court shuts out 
pre-1950 atrocities, but at the same time it seems to clear the way for inquiries into 
events of the second half of the twentieth century, even with respect to States that did 
not ratify the European Convention until the 1990s. Nor does there appear to be much 
dispute about the distant past, when there is little suggestion that States intentionally 




events persist. With respect to these very old atrocities of distant centuries and 
millennia, States are content to mutter apologies, with varying degrees of sincerity. 
But there is a problematic grey zone, starting at about 1950 and going back several 
decades, perhaps a century, when the right to truth still seems to be important yet its 
recognition encounters resistance, as it did recently in Strasbourg and The Hague. 
The right to truth is closely related to the rights to justice and to reparations. In 
some cases, at the heart of campaigns for historical truth may lie the hope of some 
compensation, of restored property, of financial gain. But it is also associated with a 
sense that knowledge of historical truth is intrinsically important. It contributes in a 
general way to justice, the rule of law, democratic governance and social wellbeing. 
For reasons that mere law cannot explain, many of us still feel emotionally connected 
to the not-so-distant past, to the grey zone. Some formulate this as an individual right, 
based on lineage to increasingly distant generations. The treatment of their immediate 
ancestors is important although the concern generally grows cold as the time frame 
becomes more remote. More generally, the ‘people’, to use the expression of the 
Joinet and Orentlicher Principles, insist upon knowing the truth about this grey zone, 
much of it well before our birth yet somehow close enough to engage us directly. In 
his report on the Spanish Civil War, Special Rapporteur De Greiff has made an 
intriguing foray into this fog of history. The consequences of his initiative are difficult 
to assess. He will doubtless receive many entreaties to look at other situations, cases, 
massacres and atrocities. Only time will tell just how far back human rights law will 
succeed in establishing a right to truth and whether, like the two prestigious Courts, it 
will also decide to bolt the door to the past.  
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